Conscience de l'action, conscience de soi

Abstract

La plupart de nos actions sont exécutées sous le contrôle de mécanismes automatiques. Le sentiment d'avoir volontairement causé une action et, par extension, la conscience de soi relèvent de mécanismes antérieurs au sentiment qu'ils causent, antériorité fondée sur la lenteur des processus aboutissant à l'expérience consciente. La conscience n'a done pas de rôle causal immédiat sur l'activité nerveuse ni sur le comportement, elle intervient a posteriori pour structurer le moi cognitif et maintenir l'unité du moi. Most of our actions are executed under the control of automatic mechanisms. The feeling one has to have willingly caused an action and — by extension — selfconsciousness, refer to the mechanisms prior to the feeling it lead to, i.e. a precedence resting on the slowness of processes leading to a conscious experience. Consciousness thus seems to have no immediate causal part to play on the nervous activity neither on behaviour, it interferes only later in order to structure the cognitive ego and keep some cohesiveness to the ego

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