The default-based context-dependence of belief reports

In K. Jaszczolt (ed.), The Pragmatics of Propositional Attitude Reports. Elsevier. pp. 169--185 (2000)
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Citations of this work

Knowledge-the and propositional attitude ascriptions.Berit Brogaard - 2008 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 77 (1):147-190.
Propositional attitude reports.Thomas McKay - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Attitude Reports: Do You Mind the Gap?Berit Brogaard - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (1):93-118.
Belief Reports and the Property Theory of Content.Neil Feit - 2013 - In Neil Feit & Alessandro Capone (eds.), Attitudes De Se: Linguistics, Epistemology, Metaphysics. CSLI Publications. pp. 105-31.

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