Does Virtue Epistemology Provide a Better Account of the Ad Hominem Argument? A Reply to Christopher Johnson

Philosophy 86 (1):95-119 (2011)
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Abstract

Christopher Johnson has put forward in this journal the view that ad hominem reasoning may be more generally reasonable than is allowed by writers such as myself, basing his view on virtue epistemology. I review his account, as well as the standard account, of ad hominem reasoning, and show how the standard account would handle the cases he sketches in defense of his own view. I then give four criticisms of his view generally: the problems of virtue conflict, vagueness, conflation of speech acts, and self-defeating counsel. I then discuss four reasons why the standard account is superior: it better fits legal reality, the account of other fallacies, psychological science, and political reality.

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Gary James Jason
California State University, Fullerton

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References found in this work

Reconsidering the ad hominem.Christopher M. Johnson - 2009 - Philosophy 84 (2):251-266.
The case for ad hominem arguments.Lawrence M. Hinman - 1982 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 60 (4):338 – 345.
Is there a case for ad hominem arguments?Gary James Jason - 1984 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62 (2):182 – 185.

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