Abstract
DAVID CHALMERS’ ARGUMENT
FOR THE LOGICAL POSSIBILITY OF ZOMBIES
S u m m a r y
This paper presents a reconstruction of the argument for the logical possibility of zombies,
proposed by David Chalmers, which has been debated in analytical philosophy for at least fifteen
years now. Beside discussing it, I’m trying to analyze every of its premises. My aim is, especially,
to present how the reasoning can show that: (a) zombies/zombie worlds are genuinely conceivable;
(b) conceivability is a good guide to possibility; (c) the possibility of zombies is philosophically
significant. I’m particularly putting emphasis on some issues concerning two-dimensional semantics
and distinctions of conceivability. The conclusion of this paper is that the argument is still not
refuted, so a discussion over it should be conducted, instead of a priori refutation. The debate over
zombies may have a positive influence on many fields of philosophical investigation.