Abstract
What are the moral implications of cancel culture? If it is viewed as
a means to achieve social justice, we might be more inclined to say that cancel
culture is morally good. However, one could argue that cancel culture has too
harsh consequences or involves immoral – even hateful – behaviour. We propose
that cancel culture is used as an umbrella term for (at least) two different
kinds of ‘cancelling’. Cancelling is often seen in public debate as punishment.
Following Radzik’s objections to social punishment we argue that this kind of
cancelling is morally reprehensible. However, cancel culture as an umbrella term
also includes other kinds of cancelling. Many also refer to cancel culture as a
phenomenon when someone is being called out or held accountable for their
supposedly problematic behaviour. Such cancelling does not need to be punishment,
but is often rather an attempt to remove privileged access to the public
sphere. In this way, cancelling is used as a tool for redistributing attention: it can
(re)claim attention and recognition for marginalized perspectives, by a radical
attempt to deny a privileged person access to the public sphere. We conclude
that cancel culture as a whole cannot be seen as either morally good or bad,
because ‘cancelling’ can be used as a tool for both punishment and redistribution.
Each have their own moral implications: cancelling as punishment is reprehensible,
but cancelling to redistribute attention might be less of a problem.