Quantitative Parsimony: Probably for the Better

British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 68 (3):781–803 (2017)
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Abstract

ABSTRACT Our aim in this article is to offer a new justification for preferring theories that are more quantitatively parsimonious than their rivals. We discuss cases where it seems clear that those involved opted for more quantitatively parsimonious theories. We extend previous work on quantitative parsimony by offering an independent probabilistic justification for preferring the more quantitatively parsimonious theories in particular episodes of theory choice. Our strategy allows us to avoid worries that other considerations, such as pragmatic factors of computational tractability and so on, could be the driving ones in the historical cases under consideration. _1_ Introduction _2_ Three Desiderata _2.1_ Limiting _2.2_ Robustness _2.3_ Breadth _2.3.1_ A limited success for Baker _2.3.2_ Rejecting Baker’s analysis _2.4_ The proposal _3_ Probabilistically Additive Hypotheses and a Bayesian Account: The Limpid Rationale Relativized and Reconsidered _3.1_ Neutrinos and beta decay _3.2_ Avogadro’s hypothesis _3.3_ Postulation of Neptune _4_ Conclusion

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Author Profiles

Lina Jansson
Nottingham University
Jonathan Tallant
Nottingham University

Citations of this work

Simplicity.Alan Baker - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Mathematical Explanation by Law.Sam Baron - 2019 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 70 (3):683-717.
Measuring Ontological Simplicity.Noel Saenz - forthcoming - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy.
Machian Comparativism about Mass.Niels C. M. Martens - 2022 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 73 (2):325-349.

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References found in this work

When is parsimony a virtue.Michael Huemer - 2009 - Philosophical Quarterly 59 (235):216-236.
Quantitative parsimony.Daniel Nolan - 1997 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 48 (3):329-343.
Simplicity.Alan Baker - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
The principle of parsimony.Elliott Sober - 1981 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 32 (2):145-156.

View all 9 references / Add more references