Abstract
This paper investigates Kit Fine's account of the nature of material objects – the theory of embodiments.1 This theory is custom-fitted to an intuitive distinction between ‘timeless’ and ‘temporary’ parthood. It incorporates these notions by postulating two operations by which objects can be generated from their (immediate) parts. The operation of ‘rigid embodiment’ generates objects which have their immediate parts timelessly. In contrast, any product of the alternative operation, ‘variable embodiment’, has only temporary material parts. I shall argue that Fine's operations of embodiment cannot account for what I call ‘nucleated wholes’ – objects which have both timeless and temporary immediate parts. As such, the theory of embodiment does not account for a significant class of material things. Having explained the problem, I consider four ways in which Fine's theory might be defended. None of these responses is entirely satisfactory. I conclude by highlighting two ways in which one might continue – either proceeding within Fine's ‘operationalist’ framework, or dropping this and developing an alternative framework.