Acta Analytica 23 (1):45-54 (2008)

Authors
Mikael Janvid
Stockholm University
Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to refute the widespread view that challenging a knowledge-claim always raises the original standards of justification–a view often associated with contextualism. To that purpose the distinction between undermining and overriding defeaters will be used. Three kinds of challenges will be considered that differ in their degree of specification. In all three kinds of challenges, the rising standards of justification model fails to capture the dialectic of justification in the case of undermining defeaters. At the end, the skeptical challenge will more briefly be given a similar analysis.
Keywords Justification  Contextualism  Overriding and undermining defeaters  Skepticism
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DOI 10.1007/s12136-008-0019-z
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References found in this work BETA

Mind and World.John McDowell - 1994 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Knowledge and Practical Interests.Jason Stanley - 2005 - Oxford University Press.
Elusive Knowledge.David K. Lewis - 1996 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (4):549 – 567.
Scorekeeping in a Language Game.David Lewis - 1979 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 8 (1):339--359.

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Citations of this work BETA

Defeater Goes External.Mikael Janvid - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (2):701-715.

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