Both John Langshaw Austin and Willard Van Orman Quine were critical of the traditional division of propositions into the two categories: analytic and synthetic. their criticism has, however, a di erent character. Quine questions the usefulness of the notion of analyticity, whereas Austin does not accept the view that every proposition should be considered either analytic or synthetic. According to Quine, we have to abandon the notion of analyticity because we cannot de ne it in a satisfactory way. Quine’s criticism is based on his conviction that the very notion of meaning is suspicious om the scienti c point of view. this general outlook is supported by arguments the point of which is to show that we cannot avoid an indeterminacy of translation. Austin criticises the distinction for di erent reasons. According to him, it is not the notion of meaning which is suspicious, but a certain model of this notion — a model which is based on false analogies. In my text, I compare these two approaches and point out that they have di erent metaphilosophical sources. the main di erence lies in the fact that, according to Austin, statements about linguistic meaning usually have a descriptive character, whereas Quine claims that linguistic meanings are theoretical entities. In the last part of my article, I discuss the thesis of indeterminacy of translation and assess its credibility, as it plays a key role in Quine’s criticism of the notion of meaning.
Keywords John Langshaw Austin   Willard Van Orman Quine   analytic   synthetic   meaning   indetermi‐ nacy of translation
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References found in this work BETA

In Defense of a Dogma.H. P. Grice & P. F. Strawson - 1956 - Philosophical Review 65 (2):141-158.
On the Reasons for Indeterminacy of Translation.W. V. Quine - 1970 - Journal of Philosophy 67 (6):178-183.
Indeterminacy of Translation Again.W. V. Quine - 1987 - Journal of Philosophy 84 (1):5-10.
Speaking of Objects.W. V. Quine - 1957 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 31 (3):5 - 22.
In Defense of a Dogma.H. P. Grice & P. F. Strawson - 1958 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 23 (1):70-71.

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