Why Practices?

Raisons Politiques 51:43-62 (2013)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The practice-based method of justification requires sensitivity to social practices. This raises difficult questions: Must the practices in question be established or at least realistic? How “constructive” can we be in our interpretation of their form or aims? This paper suggests that our answers to these questions can vary with our explanatory purposes. Requirements of realism and sociological accuracy are relatively thin given purely intellectual aims of moral understanding, thicker given the aim of addressing humanity, and thicker still given the aim of justifying principles as normative for us , in our current world historical situation. I suggest that we have no reason to insist on one set of animating justice concerns to the exclusion of all the others, even as normative requirements rightly take center stage.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,386

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Social practices and normativity.Joseph Rouse - 2007 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 37 (1):46-56.
Why Relational Egalitarians Should Care About Distributions.Christian Schemmel - 2011 - Social Theory and Practice 37 (3):365-390.

Analytics

Added to PP
2014-07-08

Downloads
74 (#218,767)

6 months
6 (#504,917)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Citations of this work

Livability and a Framework for Climate Mobilities Justice.Gianfranco Pellegrino - forthcoming - Philosophy and Public Issues - Filosofia E Questioni Pubbliche.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references