Abstract

In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant announced the birth of transcendental philosophy by turning to the “subject;” in the First Introduction to the Wissenschaftslehre, Fichte launched his style of transcendental philosophy by turning to the “I”; and, finally, in the Cartesian Meditations, Husserl introduces the “transcendental attitude” by turning to the transcendental subject. What is it then that characterizes the subject that transcendental philosophy in all its varied forms is, in one form or another, based on it? I want to defend the thesis that it is the interpretive power of the subject that makes it a productive ground of transcendental philosophy. One implication of this claim is that the current debate about the primacy of hermeneutics over philosophy is misguided. This debate began with Heidegger’s critique of Husserl. It has been advanced by Gadamer and, to be sure, by Derrida. Hermeneutics and philosophy are not opposed; on the contrary, they relate to one another interdependently. However, because of the teleological determination of philosophy—to find the truth—it is transcendental philosophy that posits and limits the scope of hermeneutics, i.e., the interpretive powers of the subject. Another consequence of the thesis proposed is that the interdependence of transcendental philosophy and hermeneutics nullifies the ground of the debate about the question whether transcendental philosophy is inherently idealistic; it will turn out that a consequent transcendental philosophy is both idealistic and realistic.