Metaphilosophy 44 (4):383-408 (2013)

Authors
Alison Jaggar
University of Colorado, Boulder
Theresa Tobin
Marquette University
Abstract
This is the first of two companion articles drawn from a larger project, provisionally entitled Undisciplining Moral Epistemology. The overall goal is to understand how moral claims may be rationally justified in a world characterized by cultural diversity and social inequality. To show why a new approach to moral justification is needed, it is argued that several currently influential philosophical accounts of moral justification lend themselves to rationalizing the moral claims of those with more social power. The present article explains how discourse ethics is flawed just in this way. The article begins by identifying several conditions of adequacy for assessing reasoning practices designed to achieve moral justification and shows that, when used in contexts of cultural diversity and social inequality, discourse ethics fails these conditions. It goes on to argue that the failure of discourse ethics is rooted in its reliance on a broader conception of moral epistemology that is invidiously idealized. It concludes by pointing to the need to rethink both the mission and the method of moral epistemology
Keywords cultural diversity  discourse ethics  epistemological bias  social inequality  moral epistemology  cross‐cultural justification  moral justification
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/meta.12048
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 65,740
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Two Dogmas of Empiricism.W. Quine - 1951 - [Longmans, Green].
Two Dogmas of Empiricism.Willard V. O. Quine - 1951 - Philosophical Review 60 (1):20–43.

View all 24 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Conceptual Ethics and The Methodology of Normative Inquiry.David Plunkett & Tristram McPherson - 2020 - In Alexis Burgess, Herman Cappelen & David Plunkett (eds.), Conceptual Engineering and Conceptual Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 274-303.
Capable Deliberators: Towards Inclusion of Minority Minds in Discourse Practices.Thomas Schramme - forthcoming - Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy:1-24.
The Ineffable and the Ethical.Amia Srinivasan - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (1):215-223.

View all 9 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

The Relevance of Trust for Moral Justification.Theresa Weynand Tobin - 2011 - Social Theory and Practice 37 (4):599-628.
Modernity and Morality in Habermas's Discourse Ethics.James Gordon Finlayson - 2000 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 43 (3):319 – 340.
Moral Skepticism and Justification.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 1996 - In Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & Mark Timmons (eds.), Moral Knowledge? New Readings in Moral Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
Do Normative Facts Need to Explain?Jeremy Randel Koons - 2000 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 81 (3):246–272.
Do We Really Want a Moral Justification of Our Basic Ideals?James R. Flynn - 1974 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 17 (1-4):151 – 173.
Moral Epistemology in Islamic Theology.Mohsen Javadi - 2008 - Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 10:207-214.
Topical Epistemologies.Todd Stewart - 2007 - Metaphilosophy 38 (1):23–43.
Against Moral Truths.Seungbae Park - 2012 - Cultura 9 (1):179-194.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2013-07-04

Total views
137 ( #80,552 of 2,462,871 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
2 ( #299,182 of 2,462,871 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes