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Rule-based and Resource-bounded: A New Look at Epistemic Logic
Abstract
Syntactic logics do not suffer from the problems of logical omniscience but are often thought to lack interesting properties relating to epistemic notions. By focusing on the case of rule-based agents, I develop a framework for modelling resource-bounded agents and show that the resulting models have a number of interesting properties.Author's Profile
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Citations of this work
Dynamic Epistemic Logic for Implicit and Explicit Beliefs.Fernando R. Velázquez-Quesada - 2014 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 23 (2):107-140.
The dynamics of awareness.Fernando R. Velázquez-Quesada & Johan van Benthem - 2010 - Synthese 177 (S1):5 - 27.
Imagine the possibilities: information without overload.Mark Jago - 2006 - Logique Et Analyse 49 (196):345–371.
Generation and Selection of Abductive Explanations for Non-Omniscient Agents.Fernando Soler-Toscano & Fernando R. Velázquez-Quesada - 2014 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 23 (2):141-168.
References found in this work
Reasoning about knowledge.Ronald Fagin, Joseph Y. Halpern, Yoram Moses & Moshe Vardi - 2003 - Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
Knowledge and Belief: An Introduction to the Logic of the Two Notions.Jaakko Hintikka - 1962 - Studia Logica 16:119-122.
SOAR: An architecture for general intelligence.John E. Laird, Allen Newell & Paul S. Rosenbloom - 1987 - Artificial Intelligence 33 (1):1-64.
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