Ambiguous figures and the spatial contents of perceptual experience: a defense of representationalism

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (3):325-346 (2011)
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Abstract

Representationalists hold that the phenomenal character of a perceptual experience is identical with, or supervenes on, an aspect of its representational content. As such, representationalism could be disproved by a counter-example consisting of two experiences that have the same representational content but differ in phenomenal character. In this paper, I discuss two recently proposed counter-examples to representationalism that involve ambiguous or reversible figures. I pursue two goals. My first, and most important, goal is to show that the representationalist can offer plausible responses to both counter-examples. My second goal is to show the implications of these responses for the nature of the spatial representational contents of perceptual experiences

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Rene Jagnow
University of Georgia

Citations of this work

Different Kinds of Fusion Experiences.Alberto Voltolini - 2020 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 11 (1):203-222.
Ambiguous figures, attention, and perceptual content: reply to Jagnow.Bence Nanay - 2011 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (4):557-561.
The phenomenology of embodied attention.Diego D’Angelo - 2020 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 19 (5):961-978.

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Reference and Consciousness.John Campbell - 2002 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Consciousness and Experience.William G. Lycan - 1996 - Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

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