Abstract

Reliability theories of epistemic justification provide solutions to certain central problems in epistemology. They answer the radical skeptic, explaining how justification regarding the external world is possible. They answer the radical skeptic in this way, without compromising the high truth-linked standards that the skeptic insists are necessary for justification. Furthermore, they provide theory and practice independent standards for epistemic evaluations. ;Given the theoretical power of reliability theories, the question arises, how is this possible? How is it possible that reliability theories provide solutions to problems that have been intractable from the standpoint of classical internalist theories, both foundational and coherentist? ;The aim of this dissertation is to answer this question. The answer is developed as follows. The fundamental assumptions and problems of coherentist and foundationalist versions of classical internalism are discussed. There is an examination of several prominent examples of reliability theories, bringing out the major theoretical advantages of reliability theories over classical internalist theories. The question is raised, what accounts for the theoretical power of reliability theories as compared to classical internalist theories. Various answers to this question that have appeared in the literature are criticized--including answers given by Goldman, Pollock, and Foley. An alternative answer is defended, which is that reliability theories gain their theoretical power by sacrificing a central assumption governing classical internalist theories of justification, the assumption that justification depends essentially and only on the reasons an individual possesses in support of what he believes. Finally, the possibility is explored of such a reason-based theory of justification which is an alternative to both reliabilist and classical internalist theories