What Minds Can Do: Intentionality in a Non-Intentional World

New York: Cambridge University Press (1997)
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Abstract

Some of a person's mental states have the power to represent real and imagined states of affairs: they have semantic properties. What Minds Can Do has two goals: to find a naturalistic or non-semantic basis for the representational powers of a person's mind, and to show that these semantic properties are involved in the causal explanation of the person's behaviour. In the process, this 1997 book addresses issues that are central to much contemporary philosophical debate. It will be of interest to a wide range of readers in philosophy of mind and of language, cognitive science, and psychology.

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2009, 2011

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B105.I56.J33 1997

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9780511583315   9780521574013   9780511822964   0521574013   0521574366
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Author's Profile

Pierre Jacob
Institut Jean Nicod

Citations of this work

Teleological theories of mental content.Peter Schulte & Karen Neander - 2022 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
The language of thought hypothesis.Murat Aydede - 2010 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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