Abstract

The moral life is more complicated for some people than for others. Moral imagination allows for greater awareness of moral obligations. If a person is incapable of perceiving some of his obligations, and could not perceive them even if he were living the moral life in the most conscientious way , then he cannot be blamed for not recognizing those obligations that he misses. But many of us are capable of being more attentive to our moral surroundings. Those who are capable of developing and applying moral imagination, and yet do not, display a form of moral weakness. ;The first part of this project explores the role of imaginative sympathy in living the moral life. The two areas of "living the moral life" on which I focus are making moral judgments and displaying a "respect for persons." I also explore the relationship between imaginative sympathy and some other key concepts of morality--namely, justice, beneficence, and obligation. ;The second part of this project suggests some elements of a theory of moral education based upon the preceding discussion of imaginative sympathy. Some of these suggestions are opposed to popular views of moral education, such as the values clarification approach and the hypothetical moral situations approach. The approach I present retains the best elements of these approaches, however, and also calls for a return to a traditional humanities curriculum. This curriculum should be taught from what I call a "people like us" viewpoint. A "people like us" emphasis includes the affirmation that the choices of other people are self-justified and are, therefore worthy of initial respect, and the realization that the choices of people are fallible and, therefore, this initial respect should be tempered with critical evaluation of the choices. The "people like us" emphasis on education will best stimulate the kind of moral imagination that is the focus of the first part of this project