Sensibility theory and projectivism

In David Copp (ed.), The Oxford handbook of ethical theory. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 186--218 (2006)
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Abstract

This chapter explores the debate between contemporary projectivists or expressivists, and the advocates of sensibility theory. Both positions are best viewed as forms of sentimentalism — the theory that evaluative concepts must be explicated by appeal to the sentiments. It argues that the sophisticated interpretation of such notions as “true” and “objective” that are offered by defenders of these competing views ultimately undermines the significance of their meta-ethical disputes over “cognitivism” and “realism” about value. Their fundamental disagreement lies in moral psychology; it concerns how best to understand the emotions to which sentimentalist theories must appeal.

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Author Profiles

Justin D'Arms
Ohio State University
Daniel Jacobson
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor

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