State consciousness revisited

Abstract

I try to reconcile Dretske's representational theory of conscious mental states with Rosenthal's higher-order thought (HOT) theory of conscious mental states by arguing that Rosenthal's HOT can make room for the notion of a state of consciousness whereby an invidual may be conscious of an object or property without thereby being conscious of being in such a state.

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Pierre Jacob
Institut Jean Nicod

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