Powerful Qualities, Not Pure Powers

The Monist 94 (1):81-102 (2011)
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Abstract

I explore two accounts of properties within a dispositional essentialist (or causal powers) framework, the pure powers view and the powerful qualities view. I first attempt to clarify precisely what the pure powers view is, and then raise objections to it. I then present the powerful qualities view and, in order to avoid a common misconception, offer a restatement of it that I shall call the truthmaker view. I end by briefly defending the truthmaker view against objections.

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Jonathan D. Jacobs
Saint Louis University

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