Precis of Ways of Seeing, the Scope and Limits of Visual Cognition

Abstract

Human vision raises a number of puzzles. Among them are the puzzles of visual experience: how to provide a scientific understanding of the phenomenal character of the visual experiences of the shapes, textures, colors, orientations and motion of perceived objects? How can a purely subjective visual experience be the basis of so much objective knowledge of the world? Visually guided actions raise a different puzzle: how can actions directed towards a target be so accurate in the absence of the agent’s awareness of many of the target’s visual attributes? Ways of Seeing has three related goals, the first of which is to make the case for a broadly representational approach to the above set of puzzles. The second goal of WoS is to argue that the version of the ‘two-visual systems’ model of human vision best supported by the current empirical evidence has the resources to solve the puzzle of visually guided actions, which has been at the center of much recent work in the cognitive neuroscience of vision and action. The third goal of WoS is to draw attention to some of the tensions between acceptance of the two-visual systems model of human vision and some influential views about the nature and function of the content of visual experience espoused by philosophers in response to the puzzles raised by visual experience

Download options

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 72,694

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2015-02-05

Downloads
10 (#906,681)

6 months
1 (#388,311)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Pierre Jacob
Institut Jean Nicod

References found in this work

A Sensorimotor Account of Vision and Visual Consciousness.J. Kevin O’Regan & Alva Noë - 2001 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (5):883-917.
Seeing And Knowing.Fred I. Dretske - 1969 - Chicago: University Of Chicago Press.
The Visual Brain in Action (Precis).David Milner - 1998 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 4.
Pushmi-Pullyu Representations.Ruth Garrett Millikan - 1995 - Philosophical Perspectives 9:185-200.

View all 10 references / Add more references

Similar books and articles

Why Visual Experience is Likely to Resist Being Enacted.Pierre Jacob - 2006 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 12.
Visual Stuff and Active Vision.Wayne Wright - 2006 - Philosophical Psychology 19 (2):129-149.
From Two Visual Systems to Two Forms of Content?Jose Bermudez - 2007 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 13.
COGNITIVE (IM)PENETRABILITY OF VISION: RESTRICTING VISION Vs. RESTRICTING COGNITION.Costas Pagondiotis - 2015 - In J. Zeimbekis & A. Raftopoulos (eds.), Cognitive Penetrability. Oxford University Press. pp. 378-403.
The Admissible Contents of Visual Experience.Michael Tye - 2009 - Philosophical Quarterly 59 (236):541-562.
The Phenomenal Character of Visual Consciousness.Robert Schroer - 2003 - Dissertation, University of Illinois at Chicago
Concepts About Agency Constrain Beliefs About Visual Experience.Daniel T. Levin - 2012 - Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):875-888.