Philosophical Studies 173 (8):2087-2103 (2016)

Authors
Abstract
According to Perceptual Fundamentalism we can have justified perceptual beliefs solely in virtue of having perceptual experiences with corresponding contents. Recently, it has been argued that Perceptual Fundamentalism entails that it is possible to gain an a priori justified belief that perception is reliable by engaging in a suppositional reasoning process of a priori bootstrapping. But I will show that Perceptual Fundamentalists are not committed to a priori bootstrapping being a rational reasoning process. On the most plausible versions of Perceptual Fundamentalism, a priori bootstrapping cannot be used to rationally support anti-sceptical beliefs about the reliability of perception. Moreover, seeing why Perceptual Fundamentalists are not committed to a priori bootstrapping will help us to better understand the nature of the perceptual entitlements that Perceptual Fundamentalists posit, or at least should posit.
Keywords a priori bootstrapping  dogmatism  phenomenal conservatism  perceptual justification  suppositional reasoning  Ralph Wedgwood  Stewart Cohen
Categories (categorize this paper)
ISBN(s)
DOI 10.1007/s11098-015-0598-7
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 69,018
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

The Skeptic and the Dogmatist.James Pryor - 2000 - Noûs 34 (4):517–549.
Compassionate Phenomenal Conservatism.Michael Huemer - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):30–55.
Intuition.Elijah Chudnoff - 2013 - Oxford University Press.
Normative Requirements.John Broome - 1999 - Ratio 12 (4):398–419.
The Limits of Self-Awareness.Michael G. F. Martin - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 120 (1-3):37-89.

View all 22 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

The Dispositional Architecture of Epistemic Reasons.Hamid Vahid - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (7):1887-1904.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Bootstrapping, Defeasible Reasoning, and a Priori Justification.Stewart Cohen - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):141-159.
How To Be Conservative: A Partial Defense of Epistemic Conservatism.Paul Silva - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (3):501-514.
Liberalism and Conservatism in the Epistemology of Perceptual Belief.Ram Neta - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (4):685-705.
¿Qué está mal con el dogmatismo de Pryor?Jorge Ornelas Bernal & G. Cíntora - 2014 - Areté. Revista de Filosofía 26 (1):7-31.
Grounding Perceptual Dogmatism: What Are Perceptual Seemings?Harmen Ghijsen - 2015 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 53 (2):196-215.
An Inferentialist Conception of the A Priori.Ralph Wedgwood - 2015 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 5:295–314.
Liberal Fundamentalism and its Rivals.Peter Graham - 2006 - In Jennifer Lackey & Ernest Sosa (eds.), The Epistemology of Testimony. Oxford University Press. pp. 93--115.
In Defense of Epistemic Modesty.Farid Masrour - 2011 - Philosophical Issues 21 (1):312-331.
Perceptual Reports.Berit Brogaard - 2015 - In Mohan Matthen (ed.), Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Perception. Oxford University Press.
A Priori Bootstrapping.Ralph Wedgwood - 2013 - In Albert Casullo & Joshua Thurow (eds.), The A Priori In Philosophy. Oxford University Press. pp. 226-246.
Perceptual Justification and Warrant by Default.Chris Tucker - 2009 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87: 445-63 87 (3):445-63.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2015-12-21

Total views
112 ( #103,083 of 2,498,401 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
5 ( #140,236 of 2,498,401 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes