Male sexual victimisation, failures of recognition, and epistemic injustice

In Paul Giladi & Nicola McMillan (eds.), Epistemic injustice and the philosophy of recognition. New York, NY: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group. pp. 279-296 (2022)
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Abstract

Whether in the form of testimonial injustice, hermeneutical injustice, or contributory injustice, epistemic injustice is characterised an injustice rather than simply an epistemic harm because it is often motivated by an identity prejudice and exacerbates existing social disadvantages and inequalities. I argue that epistemic injustice can also be utlised against some members of privileged social identity groups in order to preserve the dominant status of the group as a whole. As a case-study, I analyze how the harms to male victims of sexual violence is exacerbated by the failure of the law to recognise the rape of men as a crime and the failure of other people to recognise the testimony of male rape victims as credible. Analyzing shifts in the legal concept of rape and examples from Project Unbreakable, I uncover how these failures of recognition undermine the victims’ status as legal, moral, and epistemic subjects and inflict epistemic injustice against them.

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Debra L. Jackson
California State University, Bakersfield

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