James' pragmatic account of intentionality and truth

Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 34 (1):155-181 (1998)
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Abstract

William James presents a preference-sensitive and future-directed notion of truth that has struck many as wildly revisionary. This paper argues that such a reaction usually results from failing to see how his accounts of truth and intentionality are intertwined. James' forward-looking account of intentionality (or "knowing") compares favorably the 'causal' and 'resemblance-driven' accounts that have been popular since his day, and it is only when his remarks about truth are placed in the context of his account of intentionality that they come to seem as plausible as they manifestly did to James

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Henry Jackman
York University

Citations of this work

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William James.Henry Jackman - 2008 - In Cheryl Misak (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of American Philosophy. New York, USA: Oxford University Press. pp. 60-86.

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References found in this work

Truth and its verification.James Bissett Pratt - 1907 - Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 4 (12):320-324.
Truth and its Verification.James Bissett Pratt - 1907 - Journal of Philosophy 4 (12):320.

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