Do Experiences Represent?

Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 53 (1):87-103 (2010)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The paper contains four arguments to show that experiences don't represent. The first argument appeals to the fact that an experience can't occur without what the experience is of; the second appeals to the fact we can have an experience without having any awareness of what it is of, the third argument appeals to the fact that long experiences, such as the experience of being kidnapped, don't represent anything; and the fourth appeals to the fact that experiences often leave physical traces. The author rebuts several arguments for the conclusion that experiences represent. The author also considers some of the pitfalls involved in stipulating that experiences represent in a technical sense of “experience” or “represent”

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 90,616

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

The represented object of color experience.Elizabeth Schier - 2007 - Philosophical Psychology 20 (1):1 – 27.
Care for one's own future experiences.Marc Slors - 2004 - Philosophical Explorations 7 (2):183-195.
Strong representationalism and centered content.Berit Brogaard - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 151 (3):373 - 392.
Demonstrative concepts without reidentification.Philippe Chuard - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 130 (2):153-201.
Presentational Phenomenology.Elijah Chudnoff - 2012 - In Sofia Miguens & Gerhard Preyer (eds.), Consciousness and Subjectivity. [Place of publication not identified]: Ontos Verlag. pp. 51–72.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
113 (#145,559)

6 months
3 (#447,120)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Michael Jacovides
Purdue University

Citations of this work

Experiences as complex events.Michael Jacovides - 2010 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 48 (2):141-159.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Anarchy, State, and Utopia.Robert Nozick - 1974 - New York: Basic Books.
The representational character of experience.David J. Chalmers - 2004 - In Brian Leiter (ed.), The Future for Philosophy. Oxford University Press. pp. 153--181.
Reference and Consciousness.John Campbell - 2002 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Sense and Sensibilia.John Langshaw Austin - 1962 - Oxford University Press.

View all 46 references / Add more references