Against Strong Cognitivism: An Argument from Caring

Dialogue 54 (1):139-158 (2015)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

According to ‘strong cognitivism’, all reasons for action are rooted in normative features that the motivated subject takes objects to have independently of her attitudes towards these objects. My main concern in this paper is to argue against strong cognitivism, that is, to establish the view that conative attitudes do provide subjects with reasons for action. My central argument to this effect is a top-down one that proceeds by an analysis of the complex phenomenon of caring and derives a conclusion regarding the nature of more basic mental phenomena—particular desires.Selon le «cognitivisme fort», toutes les raisons d’une action trouvent leurs sources dans des caractéristiques normatives par lesquelles l’individu motivé prend des objets comme avoir, indépendamment de son attitude à l’égard de ces objets. L’objectif majeur de cet article est de contester les arguments du cognitivisme fort, en d’autres termes, de démontrer que toute attitude volitive donne aux individus des raisons pour entreprendre une action. À cette fin, l’argument principal consistera à procéder par le biais de l’analyse du phénomène complexe de la préoccupation, pour en extrapoler une conclusion relative à la nature d’un phénomène mental plus fondamental encore : les désirs spécifiques.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 90,616

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Non-cognitivism and rational inference.Mark Bryant Budolfson - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 153 (2):243 - 259.
Against Moral Intellectualism.Zed Adams - 2013 - Philosophical Investigations 37 (1):37-56.
Moral motivation pluralism.Ragnar Francén - 2010 - The Journal of Ethics 14 (2):117-148.
Disentangling the thick concept argument.Olle Blomberg - 2007 - SATS: Northern European Journal of Philosophy 8 (2):63-78.
How to stand up for non-cognitivists.Huw Price - 1996 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (2):275-292.
The Pragmatics of Moral Motivation.Caj Strandberg - 2011 - The Journal of Ethics 15 (4):341-369.
Dilemmas and Moral Realism.Nick Zangwill - 1999 - Utilitas 11 (1):71.
Pure Cognitivism and Beyond.Attila Tanyi - 2014 - Acta Analytica 29 (3):331-348.
Soames’s argument 1 against strong two-dimensionalism.Robert Michels - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 161 (3):403-420.
The essence of a person.Peter A. Bertocci - 1978 - The Monist 61 (January):28-41.

Analytics

Added to PP
2015-09-03

Downloads
44 (#317,940)

6 months
2 (#670,035)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Hilla Jacobson
Hebrew University of Jerusalem

Citations of this work

Not Only a Messenger: Towards an Attitudinal‐Representational Theory of Pain.Hilla Jacobson - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (2):382-408.

Add more citations

References found in this work

What we owe to each other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Reasons and Persons.Joseph Margolis - 1986 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (2):311-327.
The Morality of Freedom.Joseph Raz - 1986 - Philosophy 63 (243):119-122.
Free agency.Gary Watson - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (April):205-20.

View all 28 references / Add more references