Croatian Journal of Philosophy 10 (2):147-155 (2010)
AbstractFor some contemporary liberal philosophers, a huge concern is liberal neutrality, which is the idea that the state should be neutral among competing conceptions of the moral good pursued by the people. In The Morality of Freedom, Joseph Raz argues that we can neither achieve nor even approximate such neutrality. He shows that neutrality and fairness are different ideas. His notion of neutrality is stricter than John Rawls's and Ronald Dworkin's. Raz shows that both helping and not helping can be neutral or non-neutral, thus neutrality is chimerical. Wojciech Sadurski's appeal to rational expectations does not necessarily tell us which action is neutral. Distinguishing between comprehensive and narrow neutrality, Raz also claims that only the former is a proper response to conflicts. Sadurski criticizes it, claiming that conflicts are comprehensive in a sense which does not deny the adequacy of the narrow neutrality. In reality, however, it is almost impossible to achieve even the narrow neutrality. A theory is presented to explain why political neutrality is almost impossible to achieve. Philosophically, there is no neutral ground for neutral politics.
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References found in this work
Joseph Raz on Liberal Neutrality and the Harm Principle.Wojciech Sadurski - 1990 - Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 10 (1):122-133.
Philosophy and the Practice of Freedom: An Interview with Joseph Raz.Roberto Farneti - 2006 - Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 9 (1):71-84.
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