Sentimentalism and the Is-Ought Problem
Croatian Journal of Philosophy 11 (3):323-352 (2011)
Abstract
Examining the moral sense theories of Francis Hutcheson, David Hume, and Adam Smith from the perspective of the is-ought problem, this essay shows that the moral sense or moral sentiments in those theories alone cannot identify appropriate morals. According to one interpretation, Hume's or Smith's theory is just a description of human nature. In this case, it does not answer the question of how we ought to live. According to another interpretation, it has some normative implications. In this case, it draws normative claims from human nature. Anyway, the sentiments of anger, resentment, vengeance, superiority, sympathy, and benevolence show that drawing norms from human nature is sometimes morally problematic. The changeability of the moral sense and moral sentiments in Hume's and Smith's theories supports this idea. Hutcheson's theory is morally more appropriate because it bases morality on disinterested benevolence. Yet disinterested benevolence is not enough for morality. There are no sentiments the presence of which alone makes any action moral.Author's Profile
ISBN(s)
1333-1108
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Citations of this work
Reason Alone Cannot Identify Moral Laws.Noriaki Iwasa - 2013 - Journal of Value Inquiry 47 (1-2):67-85.
Moral Applicability of Agrippa’s Trilemma.Noriaki Iwasa - 2013 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 13 (1):109-128.
References found in this work
The Impartial Spectator: Adam Smith's Moral Philosophy.D. D. Raphael - 2007 - Oxford University Press.
A Third Concept of Liberty: Judgment and Freedom in Kant and Adam Smith.Samuel Fleischacker - 1999 - Princeton University Press.