Reasonable doubt: Does it need its own justification
130 Years Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-2019) - Conference Proceedings (
2020)
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Abstract
In “On Certainty” Wittgenstein regards doubting
as meaningful and reasonable only in a context providing language
game where some background is taken for granted. Doubt, just as
knowledge, should be backed up by an argument, only this time,
one presenting reasons for uncertainty. Common sense propositions
constitute part of the background for the arguments of doubting
and because of their function and place within the system of
language, they are regarded as indubitable. I discuss critically the
idea of linguistically determined indubitability and advocate the
possibility of a different kind of doubt, one that does not require its
own justification and is still a reasonable epistemic attitude. Such
doubt characterizes the states of affairs where the certainty of a
proposition is not yet rationally established. I argue that, language
does not limit us in doubting and in doubting reasonably.