How to tell essence

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (2):147-168 (2019)
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Abstract

How could perceptual experiences reveal matters of essentiality? Answering this question is crucial for vindicating a thesis about the epistemic import of experience, commonly known as Revelation. The thesis comes in a weak and a strong version. Only on the strong one could it make up an authoritative piece of common sense. But this version also seems to demand too much of our experiences, namely that they can reveal essentiality. However, the impression that our experiences are not suited for this turns out to be due to a non-mandatory assumption about how the revelation of essentiality would work.

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Ivan V. Ivanov
Capital Normal University

Citations of this work

Properties in sight and in thought.Ivan V. Ivanov - 2019 - Synthese 198 (8):7049-7071.

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References found in this work

On the Plurality of Worlds.David K. Lewis - 1986 - Malden, Mass.: Wiley-Blackwell.
Reference and Consciousness.John Campbell - 2002 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
The Contents of Visual Experience.Susanna Siegel - 2010 - , US: Oxford University Press USA.
Essence and modality.Kit Fine - 1994 - Philosophical Perspectives 8 (Logic and Language):1-16.
On the Plurality of Worlds.David Lewis - 1986 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 178 (3):388-390.

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