Moral Worth: Having It Both Ways

Journal of Philosophy 117 (10):529-556 (2020)
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Abstract

It is commonly recognized that one can act rightly without being praiseworthy for doing so. Those who act rightly from ignoble motives, for instance, do not strike us as fitting targets of moral praise; their actions seem to lack moral worth. Though there is broad agreement that only certain kinds of motives confer moral worth on our actions, there is disagreement as to which ones are up to the task. Many theorists confine themselves to two possibilities: praiseworthy agents are thought to be motivated by either the consideration that their actions are morally right, or the considerations that explain why their actions are morally right. Though there is an important element of truth in these proposals, each has limited explanatory purchase. In this paper, I develop a pluralist conception of moral worth that acknowledges both sorts of motives as grounds for moral praise.

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Jessica Isserow
University of Notre Dame

Citations of this work

Moral Worth: You Can't Have it Both Ways.Nomy Arpaly - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Metaethics.
Admiration, Appreciation, and Aesthetic Worth.Daniel Whiting - 2023 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 101 (2):375-389.
Moral Agency Under Oppression.Sukaina Hirji - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
Moral Worth and Our Ultimate Moral Concerns.Douglas W. Portmore - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics.
Doubts about Duty as a Secondary Motive.Jessica Isserow - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 105 (2):276-298.

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