British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 47 (1):79-91 (1996)
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Abstract |
The chance of a physical event is the objective, single-case probability that it will occur. In probabilistic physical theories like quantum mechanics, the chances of physical events play the formal role that the values of physical quantities play in classical (deterministic) physics, and there is a temptation to regard them on the model of the latter as describing intrinsic properties of the systems to which they are assigned. I argue that this understanding of chances in quantum mechanics, despite being a part of the orthodox interpretation of the theory and the most prevalent view in the physical community, is incompatible with a very wide range of metaphysical views about the nature of chance. The options that remain are unlikely to be attractive to scientists and scientifically minded philosophers.
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Keywords | Quantum Mechanics |
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DOI | 10.1093/bjps/47.1.76 |
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References found in this work BETA
A Subjectivist’s Guide to Objective Chance.David K. Lewis - 1980 - In Richard C. Jeffrey (ed.), Studies in Inductive Logic and Probability, Volume II. Berkeley: University of California Press. pp. 263-293.
An Interpretive Introduction to Quantum Field Theory.Paul Teller - 1995 - Princeton University Press.
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Citations of this work BETA
Two Mistakes About Credence and Chance.Ned Hall - 2004 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (1):93 – 111.
Twenty-One Arguments Against Propensity Analyses of Probability.Antony Eagle - 2004 - Erkenntnis 60 (3):371–416.
View all 17 citations / Add more citations
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