Science and the phenomenal

Philosophy of Science 66 (3):351-69 (1999)
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Abstract

The Hard Problem of the mind is addressed and it is argued that physical-phenomenal property identities have the same status as the identification of an ostended bit of physical space and the coordinates assigned the spot on a map of the terrain. It is argued, that is to say, that such identities are, or follow from, stipulations which interpret the map

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Jenann Ismael
Columbia University

References found in this work

Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 1980 - Philosophy 56 (217):431-433.
What is the "Subjectivity" of the Mental.William G. Lycan - 1990 - Philosophical Perspectives 4:109-130.
What is the "subjectivity" of the mental?William G. Lycan - 1990 - Philosophical Perspectives 4:229-238.
Who, Me?Steven E. Boër & William G. Lycan - 1980 - Philosophical Review 89 (3):427 - 466.

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