Causation, Free Will, and Naturalism

In Don Ross, James Ladyman & Harold Kincaid (eds.), Scientific metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 208--235 (2013)
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Abstract

This chapter addresses the worry that the existence of causal antecedents to your choices means that you are causally compelled to act as you do. It begins with the folk notion of cause, leads the reader through recent developments in the scientific understanding of causal concepts, and argues that those developments undermine the threat from causal antecedents. The discussion is then used as a model for a kind of naturalistic metaphysics that takes its lead from science, letting everyday concepts be shaped and transformed by scientific developments.

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Jenann Ismael
Columbia University

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