Embedding classical in minimal implicational logic

Mathematical Logic Quarterly 62 (1-2):94-101 (2016)
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Abstract

Consider the problem which set V of propositional variables suffices for whenever, where, and ⊢c and ⊢i denote derivability in classical and intuitionistic implicational logic, respectively. We give a direct proof that stability for the final propositional variable of the (implicational) formula A is sufficient; as a corollary one obtains Glivenko's theorem. Conversely, using Glivenko's theorem one can give an alternative proof of our result. As an alternative to stability we then consider the Peirce formula. It is an easy consequence of the result above that adding a single instance of the Peirce formula suffices to move from classical to intuitionistic derivability. Finally we consider the question whether one could do the same for minimal logic. Given a classical derivation of a propositional formula not involving ⊥, which instances of the Peirce formula suffice as additional premises to ensure derivability in minimal logic? We define a set of such Peirce formulas, and show that in general an unbounded number of them is necessary.

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Citations of this work

Proof Compression and NP Versus PSPACE II.Lew Gordeev & Edward Hermann Haeusler - 2020 - Bulletin of the Section of Logic 49 (3):213-230.

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