Abstract

Finally, in Chapter VI, I defend Mill's theory--or my interpretation of it, at any rate--against certain objections that have been or might be raised against it. Among the objections I examine are the objection that Mill's theory does not allow material objects to exist in a world in which sentient beings never exist, that Mill's theory is unable to distinguish between certain clearly distinct situations that might obtain in a world, that Mill's theory cannot account for the existence of unperceivable material objects and the occurrence of unperceivable physical events, and that Mill's theory cannot account for the causal efficacy of unperceived material objects. The conclusion I ultimately draw is that Mill's theory of metaphysical phenomenalism is and should be treated as a viable theory of perception. ;In Chapter V, I interpret John Stuart Mill's dictum that "Matter . . . may be defined, a Permanent Possibility of Sensation." I argue that Mill was a metaphysical phenomenalist who held the existence of material objects to consist in sets of conditional facts about sensations. I go on to describe certain consequences of this doctrine. ;Chapter III is concerned with Berkeleian idealism. Idealism, which is a variety of metaphysical phenomenalism, identifies material objects with collections of sense-data. I examine and criticize some of the consequences of this view, and end by rejecting idealism. ;In Chapter IV, I examine Bertrand Russell's sensibilism. Sensibilism, which identifies material objects with collections of sensibilia, is a close cousin to Berkeleian idealism but is not, strictly speaking, a form of phenomenalism. I develop sensibilism as far as I can, paying particular attention to Russell's construction of space from sensibilia; I then argue against sensibilism by arguing against this last construction. ;In Chapter I, I characterize linguistic and metaphysical phenomenalism and then examine arguments that have been or might be given concerning the logical relation between these doctrines. I present reasons for thinking that metaphysical phenomenalism does not entail linguistic phenomenalism and thus that metaphysical phenomenalism might succeed even though linguistic phenomenalism fails. ;In Chapter II, I present various theories of linguistic phenomenalism that have been or might be proposed and argue that none of these theories is correct. My argument, although it does not refute linguistic phenomenalism, gives us evidence of an inductive sort that linguistic phenomenalism will not succeed. ;This dissertation examines phenomenalism, a doctrine that has been much abused of late. My examination is primarily concerned with metaphysical phenomenalism, which is the doctrine that the existence of any material object consists in a set of facts about the immediate perceptions of sentient beings, and linguistic phenomenalism, which is the doctrine that any statement solely about material objects is analytically equivalent to some statement solely about the immediate perceptions of sentient beings. I present reasons for thinking that linguistic phenomenalism is incorrect, but nevertheless argue that metaphysical phenomenalism--and, in particular, John Stuart Mill's version of it--has not, contrary to popular opinion, been refuted.