Abstract

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Ideas 62.3 (2001) 445-462 [Access article in PDF] Hobbes on Explanation and Understanding Ioli Patellis One aspect of Hobbes's philosophy of science which has not been explored in any depth is his view of the explanatory import of science. This is possibly because of the important passages in Hobbes awarding primary, if not sole, significance to the practical dimension of scientific knowledge, i.e., to science as a means of controlling and manipulating nature, an emphasis which is in tune with the general prudential tenor of Hobbes's philosophy. In addition the Hobbesian view of explanation seems straightforward enough: one explains a phenomenon when one assigns a cause to it. On the face of it there does not seem much more to be said about the matter. Hobbesian science explains because it provides knowledge of causes and causes explain because that is what causes do by definition. A problem with the explanatory force of causes arises when one surveys the great variety of conceptions of causality which have been proposed. Do they all have explanatory value and for the same reasons? Are Aristotelian causes and Humean ones of equal explanatory import and in virtue of the same traits? The case of Hobbes is of particular interest in this respect because in his work we find discussions not only of his own notion of causality as a species of efficient cause but also of Scholastic causes, deriving from Aristotle, and of prudence which is based on Humean-type regularities. One can then ask why it is that, according to Hobbes, the type of causes he espouses explain, while the other varieties do not. In attempting to answer this question I shall suggest that one of the reasons they do so is because they afford a particular sort of understanding. This in turn will provide a link with contemporary discussions of the relations between explanation and understanding, and in particular it will provide some insight into the kind of understanding afforded by systematicity by construing understanding as the integration of what is to be explained within one's body of knowledge.In this paper I attempt to piece together from hints in Hobbes's work a Hobbesian theory of explanation as understanding of a certain sort. In the first [End Page 445] section I argue that, notwithstanding his official pronouncements to the contrary, Hobbes does believe that science has theoretical as well as practical value. The second section discusses two counts on which Hobbes finds School science non-explanatory: the causes it posits are not productive processes in Hobbes's sense and the language it employs is often meaningless. The third section discusses the latter accusation in relation to Hobbes's views on understanding. The fourth section reverts to the former accusation by way of a discussion of Hobbes's views on prudence and the curiosity which leads to the positing of God as the first cause. The last brings together the results of the former two sections and suggests that Scholastic causes have no explanatory value because they do not provide understanding of the required kind. It further briefly attempts to link the latter with recent unification theories of explanation.I. "The goal or scope of philosophy is that we might be able to use previously observed effects for our benefit or that, after the effects have been discovered by the mind, similar effects might be produced through the application of bodies to bodies by the industry of men, insofar as human power and the matter of things will allow for the use of human life." 1 In this passage from De Corpore the goal of science is restricted to the prediction and manipulation of nature. This goal is eminently compatible with the Hobbesian view of science as providing infallible rational knowledge ofcausal relations. First, science provides knowledge of effects given their causes and of possible causes given their effects. 2 For according to Hobbes, a cause is the (manner of) generation or production of effects. 3 "For you enquire not so much, when you see a change...