‘Kierkegaard’: A Reasonable Fideist?

Heythrop Journal 39 (4):363–378 (1998)
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Abstract

The task I set myself is to identify whether Climacus is an extreme or moderate fideist, and to go on to evaluate how convincing or persuasive I find Climacus' position. Separating metaphysical and epistemological fideism, I spend the first section of the article denying that Climacus is a ‘metaphysical fideist’. This involves looking at the notion of ‘truth as subjectivity’. I will claim that in expounding this notorious maxim Climacus can be seen as expressing something almost trivially obvious and/or something substantially wrong. I will further argue that even the obvious version of the maxim needs to be heavily qualified before it can be a sufficient account of ‘religious truth’.In the second section of the article I argue that Climacus should be understood as a moderate fideist, who considers that reason should assent to its own limitations. Although I will approve of reason‐exhausting projects, I will complain that the paradox which is supposed to so exhaust my reason does not perplex me in the relevant sense

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