Synthese 197 (8):3349-3373 (2020)

Daniel Immerman
University of Notre Dame (PhD)
Closure principles say that if you know some proposition which entails a second and you meet further conditions then you know the second. In this paper I construct an argument against closure principles which turns on the idea that knowing a proposition requires that one’s belief-forming process be reliable. My argument parallels an influential argument offered by Timothy Williamson against KK principles–principles that say that if you know some proposition and you meet further conditions then you know that you know the proposition. After offering my argument, I provisionally assess its damage to closure principles and also look at how responses to my argument against closure principles can be used to generate responses to Williamson’s argument against KK principles.
Keywords Closure Principles  Knows-Knows Principles  Timothy Williamson  Internalism  Externalism
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-018-1890-9
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References found in this work BETA

Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.
Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 64 (1):200-201.
Evidentialism.Richard Feldman & Earl Conee - 1985 - Philosophical Studies 48 (1):15 - 34.

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