Logic and Intensionality

Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 14 (1):111–124 (2010)
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Abstract

There are different ways we use the expressions “extension” and “intension”. I specify in the first part of this paper two basic senses of this distinction, and try to show that the old metaphysical sense, by means of particular instance vs. universal, is more fundamental than the contemporary sense by means of substitutivity. In the second part, I argue that logic in general is essentially intensional, not only because logic is a rule-guided activity, but because even the extensional definition of a logic system presupposes an intensional notion of logical consequence.

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