Abstract

In this paper, I take issue with Wiredu’s characterization and criticism of the general problem of epistemic authoritarianism that he identifies in some African cultures. I then defend a plausible view of epistemic authoritarianism as a method of epistemic justification in some African cultures. I argue that both his characterization and criticism implies an affirmation of epistemic individualism and autonomy, doxastic voluntarism, and a denial of epistemic dependence. I argue against epistemic autonomy and individualism, and doxastic voluntarism, because they imply that one is always in the best epistemic position to be the best judge in order to make voluntary decisions regarding what is justifiable. But one person alone cannot have an infinite set of beliefs to determine in every possible situation what would constitute a determinate set of relevant alternatives and evidence in order to rule out any plausible or possible defeater. He would have to epistemically depend on others who may be authorities and ‘epistemically superior.’ Thus, I argue in favor of the dependence on the epistemic superiority and authority of tradition and elders as a basis for epistemic justification in African cultures---which Wiredu characterizes as epistemic authoritarianism. I suggest that there could be two senses of epistemic authoritarianism: the irrational and rational variants. I defend the latter in the context of the evidentialist notion of justification. I rely in part on the arguments of some philosophers who have attempted to provide a social and pragmatic context for the analysis of knowledge. So, my defense is an attempt to consider how social context, which is an important dimension of epistemology, may justify the notion of epistemic dependence on the authority of tradition and elders. This contextual and social analysis of knowledge and justification would lend credence to the sense of epistemic authoritarianism that underlies some African cultures. Although I concede that this plausible idea of authoritarianism may in principle discourage inquiry and questioning, I do not agree that it is as negative as Wiredu suggests. It has validity, when it is considered with respect to the contextual nature of epistemic justification. Moreover, such justification may have a particular resonance with respect to substantive beliefs which have practical relevance in the day-to-day lives of people.