Minds, Machines and Gödel

Croatian Journal of Philosophy 24 (72):381-386 (2024)
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Abstract

A very popular argument for the difference between mind and machine are Gödel’s incompleteness theorems. Here we present some of the most famous such arguments, as well as their most famous criticisms. Finally, we offer our own reconstruction of the argument and show why it is not valid.

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