Consciousness: A simpler approach to the mind-brain problem

Abstract

No explicit model of consciousness has ever been presented. This paper defines the beginnings of such a model based in mathematicians' "implicit definition" as compounded with virtual reality. Dennett's "color phi" argument suggests the necessary extension to fit real minds. I conclude that the mind is wholly intentional and virtual.

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2009-01-28

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