Knowing the intuition and knowing the counterfactual

Philosophical Studies 145 (3):435 - 443 (2009)
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Abstract

I criticize Timothy Williamson's characterization of thought experiments on which the central judgments are judgments of contingent counterfactuals. The fragility of these counterfactuals makes them too easily false, and too difficult to know

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2009-01-28

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Jonathan Ichikawa
University of British Columbia

References found in this work

The Philosophy of Philosophy.Timothy Williamson - 2007 - Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.
Frege's conception of numbers as objects.Crispin Wright - 1983 - [Aberdeen]: Aberdeen University Press.
Experimental philosophy and philosophical intuition.Ernest Sosa - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 132 (1):99-107.
Frege’s Conception of Numbers as Objects.Crispin Wright - 1983 - Critical Philosophy 1 (1):97.

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