Putnam and the Difficulty of Renouncing All Theory

International Studies in Philosophy 35 (4):55-82 (2003)
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Abstract

This paper examines the dispute between Putnam and Rorty concerning truth and rational acceptability, arguing that Putnam's criticisms of Rorty mostly miss the point and that if we treat idealized rational acceptability as immunity to self-defeating doubt, then we can see it as a sufficient, though not necessary, condition of truth.

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02705664

DOI

10.5840/intstudphil20033544

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Michael Hymers
Dalhousie University

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