Physicalism decomposed

Analysis 65 (1):33-39 (2005)
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Abstract

In this paper we distinguish two issues that are often run together in discussions about physicalism. The first issue concerns levels. How do entities picked out by non-physical terminology, such as biological or psychological terminology, relate to physical entities? Are the former identical to, or metaphysically supervenient on, the latter? The second issue concerns physical parts and wholes. How do macroscopic physical entities relate to their microscopic parts? Are the former generally determined by the latter? We argue that views on these two issues are independent of one another and should not be conflated.

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Author Profiles

David Papineau
King's College London
Andreas Hüttemann
University of Cologne

References found in this work

Thinking About Consciousness.David Papineau - 2002 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.
Unity of Science as a Working Hypothesis.Paul Oppenheim & Hilary Putnam - 1958 - Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 2:3-36.
Is there a fundamental level?Jonathan Schaffer - 2003 - Noûs 37 (3):498–517.
The Mind and its Place in Nature.Charlie Dunbar Broad - 1925 - London, England: Routledge.

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