The Notion of Awareness of Self-awareness and the Problem of Infinite Regress in the Cheng Weishi Lun

Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy 21 (2):299-316 (2022)
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Abstract

This essay aims to show that the fourfold division theory of consciousness in the Cheng Weishi Lun 成唯識論 is the third way between phenomenology and the higher-order theories of consciousness. Regarding the problem of infinite regress, in particular, this theory represents an alternative between the reflexive model and the reflective model of self-consciousness. The main purpose of this essay is not to prove or to argue for the theory, but to clearly present its structure and the systematic or Abhidharmic way of thinking that leads to the notion of awareness of self-awareness and provides a way out of the problem of infinite regress. It also points out some pertinent issues that need to be further addressed or explored, such as simultaneous causation, begging the question, reconciling the antireflexivity principle with the lamp simile for self-awareness, and aboutness.

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Critique of Pure Reason.Immanuel Kant - 1998 - Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Edited by J. M. D. Meiklejohn. Translated by Paul Guyer & Allen W. Wood.

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