The Journal of Ethics 24 (2):207-223 (2020)

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Abstract
In this paper I address the objection to sufficientarianism posed by Paula Casal and Richard Arneson, that it is hard to conceive of a sufficiency threshold such that distribution is highly important just below it, and not required at all just above it. In order to address this objection, I elaborate on the idea that sufficientarianism structurally can be seen to require two separate thresholds, which may or may not overlap. I then argue that a version of such a view is plausible. Lastly, I distinguish this view from related proposals in the literature.
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DOI 10.1007/s10892-020-09321-7
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References found in this work BETA

Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford University Press.
What is the Point of Equality.Elizabeth Anderson - 1999 - Ethics 109 (2):287-337.
The Morality of Freedom.Joseph Raz - 1986 - Philosophy 63 (243):119-122.
The morality of freedom.J. Raz - 1988 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 178 (1):108-109.
Equality and Priority.Derek Parfit - 1997 - Ratio 10 (3):202–221.

View all 24 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Why Limitarianism?Ingrid Robeyns - 2022 - Wiley: Journal of Political Philosophy 30 (2):249-270.
Thresholds in Distributive Justice.Dick Timmer - 2021 - Utilitas 33 (4):422-441.
The Limits of Limitarianism.Robert Huseby - 2022 - Wiley: Journal of Political Philosophy 30 (2):230-248.
Moral Uncertainty and Distributive Sufficiency.Michael Bukoski - 2021 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 24 (4):949-963.

View all 8 citations / Add more citations

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