Newcomb's problem, prisoners' dilemma, and collective action

Synthese 86 (2):173 - 196 (1991)
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Abstract

Among various cases that equally admit of evidentialist reasoning, the supposedly evidentialist solution has varying degrees of intuitive attractiveness. I suggest that cooperative reasoning may account for the appeal of apparently evidentialist behavior in the cases in which it is intuitively attractive, while the inapplicability of cooperative reasoning may account for the unattractiveness of evidentialist behaviour in other cases. A collective causal power with respect to agreed outcomes, not evidentialist reasoning, makes cooperation attractive in the Prisoners' Dilemma. And a natural though unwarranted assumption of such a power may account for the intuitive appeal of the one-box response in Newcomb's Problem.

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Citations of this work

Social heuristics that make us smarter.Susan Hurley - 2005 - Philosophical Psychology 18 (5):585 – 612.
Rationality and the Unit of Action.Christopher Woodard - 2011 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (2):261-277.

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Natural reasons: personality and polity.Susan L. Hurley - 1989 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Rational Decision and Causality.Ellery Eells - 2009 - Cambridge University Press.
Rational Decision and Causality.Ellery Eells - 1982 - Cambridge University Press.

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