Abstract

This dissertation addresses liberal neutrality, particularly in the work of John Rawls. ;Because "neutrality" is a protean term, I first clarify a number of its senses. The heart of the dissertation, however, is the treatment of Rawls' neutralism as it develops from A Theory of Justice through Political Liberalism. Goodness as rationality, Rawls' account of the good in Theory, is a modified version of the idea that the good is the desired. Goodness as rationality supports the account of primary goods, which operate in the original position. I show that without that support from goodness as rationality, the primary goods are not necessarily good. So Theory needs goodness as rationality, but Rawls' failure to argue for it leaves his view incomplete. And because Rawls' argument for his principles of justice assumes this essentially utilitarian account of the good, the neutrality of Theory is as limited as that of utilitarianism. ;The central argument of Political Liberalism is that disagreements between comprehensive doctrines normally are reasonable; coercion should not be practiced, where fundamental matters are at stake, on those who reasonably reject the justification for that coercion; and therefore positions on fundamentals should receive justifications neutral between comprehensive doctrines. This argument implicitly supports the neutrality between ends exhibited by goodness as rationality, and so if successful would fill a hole in Rawls' view. But the argument is inadequate. It assumes for itself a special status, that no reasonable person can reject it. But reasonable persons can reject both premises of the argument. Thus Rawls' later view cannot achieve the privileged moral and epistemological status it needs in order to be satisfactory on its own terms. ;I also address Rawls' account of public reason. I argue that public reason inevitably will be affected by comprehensive doctrines in ways that should trouble Rawls, and that his account requires people to assert for political purposes what they in fact reasonably reject. Finally, Rawls' Constitutional theory attempts an unsuccessful synthesis of opposing traditions of Constitutional interpretation.